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Abstract : During the last few years, the less favoured regions confronted to industrial decline,
have evolved from attracting foreign owned branch plants to facilitating inter-firm collaboration in
specific technological area. After defining the motivations that induce firms to cooperate, we focus
on the issue facing public authorities which promote collaboration among SMEs. We conclude our
analysis by drawing on evaluation of a project which was initiated by the Chamber of Commerce
and Industry located in Bourges (France). Our study reveals that local inter-firm cooperation has
not been fostered as expected by the initiators of this project. The limited external linkages
developed by SMEs and their inability to establish common codes of information may explain this
situation.2
IMPACT OF REGIONAL TECHNOLOGY POLICY ON LOCAL ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
1. Introduction
During the early sixties, most of the French economic activity was concentrated in Paris and
its suburbs. Aware of the limits of such a system, French public authorities decided to promote the
transfer of public and private companies outside the Paris conurbation. This policy was reinforced
by the strategy of french multinationals (Michelin, Renault, Thomson...). Seeking to employ
unskilled employees which were less payed, they relocated their subsidiaries in the Paris basin
where the working population was less skilled (Dupuy and Gilly, 1995). This move only concerned
operating units. Research and development activities were maintained in the Paris area. This
organizational scheme symbolized the Fordist mass production (Veltz, 1992).
Central government authorities and firms’headquarters were the root of this move toward
regions surrounding Paris. The French local communities did not influence those transfers. After
1982, this was not anymore the case. Thanks to the law governing decentralization, local
communities had access to new competences (Lachmann, 1997). The less favoured region,
confronted to industrial decline, have tried to benefit from this legitimacy. To compensate the
losses in employment in traditionnal sectors there has been a wide competition among these regions
to attract additional productive capacities (usually foreign owned branch plants). However the
effectiveness of these policies on the local economy has been rather limited.
In recent years, new initiatives have emerged. Local communities have understood that they
were under the dependance of foreign corporations. Consequently, they have started to build local
business networks instead of attracting existing plants.
At the same time, the national public authorities have begun to deconcentrate their power to
regional agencies. Technology policies have evolved from supporting leading domestic firms
(usually the largest in the defense, spatial and electronic sectors) to stimulating cooperations among
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), regional technical centers, universities and
institutions. The primary goal of these policies has been to promote innovation and the diffusion of
technological capabilities throughout the industrial structure.
In the present paper we will define the motivations that induce firms to establish
collaborative relationships. Then we will focus on the issue facing public authorities which promote
collaboration among SMEs and discuss the role of networks in innovation. We will conclude our
analysis by drawing on evaluation of a project, sponsored by regional public authorities which try
to facilitate interfirm cooperation.
2. Industrial cooperation : From exchange to production
According to the theory which have been chosen, the conditions that induce firms to
cooperate are different. We can distinguish at least two approaches :3
- The transaction cost perspective identifies cooperative agreements as an intermediate
governance structure between markets and hierarchies. In this perspective, technology is dissociated
from production which is secondary.
- The evolutionary theory considers that cooperation is a way to have access to
complementary capacities and to reduce irreversibility costs. In this perspective, technology
acquires its specific character through a learning process. We will place emphasis on the production
activity.
2.1. Limits of the transaction cost theory
According to Williamson, asset specificity, uncertainty, the frequency with which
transactions recur, bounded rationality and opportunism determine which governance structure is
best suited to manage transaction (Williamson, 1989).
Low asset specificity favours competitive bargains and leads to contractual solutions. To
explain the emergence of networks (the hybrid form between markets and hierarchies), Williamson
invokes the existence of stong property rights combined with intermediary asset specificity.
However markets and hybrid forms are not always adapted. When agents have to support durable
investment, competition is transformed into a bilateral transaction. In such a situation, vertical
integration is best suited to avoid opportunistic behaviors. This decision is considered as a choice of
last resort. "Try markets, try long-term contracts and other hybrid modes, and revert to hierarchy
only for compelling reasons" (Williamson, p.83, 1991).
Notwithstanding the interest of this approach to provide an analytical scheme for the study
of networks, several limits remain.
- The primary goal of this theory is to know whether a firm should make or buy a good or a
service. In this framework, firm and market are considered as perfect substitute. This situation
derives from the assumption that information is costly for transaction purpose but not for
production purpose. If one considers that the acquisition of information is costly, firms will not bear
the same production costs. So it "might be in the interest of a firm to produce its own inputs even if
transaction costs were zero and management costs were positive" (Demsetz, p.164, 1991).
Considering that technology is costly to produce also reverses the transactional approach.
According to this theory, arm’s length agreements for technology transfer are costly. Firstly agents
are engaged in negotiations to define the terms of the contract. Once the agreement is signed, they
undertake inspection to make sure that their partner is not shirking. Given these assumptions on
opportunistic behaviours, transaction costs should reach prohibitive levels when innovation is
involved. However, this is not the case. In fact negotiations which lead up to a bargain should not
be considered as a cost but as an investment (Evereare, 1993). The time lost during the bargaining
period increases the effectiveness of a project. Agents rely on this period to learn about their mutual
needs and to take decision to avoid bottlenecks during the implementation of the project. Those
permanent feedbacks help them to anticipate ex-post technical problems and speed up the access of
the innovation to the market. It strengthens firms’competitiveness.4
- The transactional approach puts too much emphasis on opportunism. By and large
recurrent transactions lead partners involved in a network to gradually trust each other. These
collaborative relationships entail learning (Lundvall, 1993).
- As one of the "four contemporary paradigms in the Theory of the Firm" described by
S.Winter (p.187, 1993), transaction cost theory is first and foremost a matter of exchange and
bounded rationality. Production is secondary. Consequently, it fails to "examine how new resource
uses are discovered, how resources are accumulated, how firms learn, which governance structures
best promote learning..." (Foss, p.12, 1996)
2.2. Cooperation as a learning process
Knowledge for production purpose cannot be considered as free. The role of the firm is not
to allocate technical competences. They have to set them up. These competences change over time
through a learning process and become tacit and specific to the firm (Foss, 1996). This change has
crucial consequences for firms’performance and economic organisation.
- The tacitness of competences make them difficult to imitate. Therefore firms’endowments
in technical capacities are not similar. Once they are built, they provide the firm with a competitive
advantage (Chandler, 1990).
- The process of knowledge creation is costly to maintain. Therefore, firms need to achieve
economies through specialization (Demsetz, op.cit.). This may explains why firms usually prefer to
concentrate their ressources toward core activities. To obtain complementary assets, two solutions
are possible : Market transaction or cooperation. However, tacitness and specificity impede the
completion of technology transfer (Teece, 1980). Thus firms cannot rely on market to have access
to new capabilities.
Cooperative agreements are suited when firms are reluctant to develop additional capacities
but need to have access to closely complementary and dissimilar activities (Richardson, 1972). It is
sought when ex-ante co-ordination between different phases of production is necessary.
Despite production and transaction costs, firms should not be reluctant to pursue a strategy
of cooperative agreements for at least two reasons :
- Considering that firms are not equally endowed with technical competence but need to
construct them, increases the financial constraints which firms bear. In this scheme, investment
costs are dissociated from receipts (Amandola and Gaffard, 1994). Thus it takes time to recover the
initial investment. This view sketch a different framework to explain industrial cooperation.
Collaborative relationships will release the financial constraints by helping firms to share the sunk
costs associated with innovation.
- The second reason relates to learning. Collaborative relationships might take a hierarchical
form. However when trust replaces uncertainty and opportunism, informal obligations may
constitute a more stable framework for interaction (Lundvall, 1988). This is possible if firms
consider that the future is more significant than the present (Jacquemin, 1987). In the case ofuser-
producer relations,thefrequency of interactive relationships have proved to speed up the innovation5
process. Indeed, frequent communications help them to specify their mutual needs. in this case,
unlike the transaction cost theory, recurrent transactions favour cooperative agreement. This
interactive learning has three dimensions (Lundvall, op.cit., 1993) :
- Technical learning exists when interaction between producers and users induces an
understanding of reciprocal needs.
- Communicative learning involves the establishment of technical code tacit and specific to
the partners.
- Social learning limits opportunism by creating similar behavioural codes.
This second theoritical approach can give a new role for local public authorities.
3. The evolution of regional policy measures
In the last few years regional policies have evolved from attracting foreign owned branch
plants to facilitating interfirm collaboration in specific technological area.
3.1. The limits of policies directed towards foreign direct investment
For many years, public authorities considered that it was necessary to attract additional
productive capacities. Employment, and its consequences on the industrial environment was one of
the most important concern of local communities dealing with multinational companies. But the
effectiveness of these policies on the industrial structure has been rather limited. Branch plant
cannot be considered as autonomous production units. They tend to have a technological strategy
defined by their parent firm. Most of the time, this signifies that the value added locally in
production of the final products is small. When inputs are supplied by imports to the facility, it
reduced the importance accorded to local subcontractors. It may cause the elimination of locally
integrated industrial system and reduces opportunities for the local economy. Moreover, it is likely
that the absence of in-house R&D and limited contacts with local markets prevents the transfer of
technology into the local economy (Amin and Thwaites, 1986).
Firms with headquarters located overseas may also disinvest from their host country and
move to another region to benefit from other financial assistances if their territory does not provide
them with specific resources. This makes endless the competition among local communities to
attract existing plants by providing generic assets such as roads, telecommunication. These
practices are familiar to every region and do not work for the integration of firms to the local
economy. When fims do not invest lump sum of money, the costs of irreversibility are limited
(Colletis and Pecqueur, 1995).
Disinvestment becomes a costless alternative. The case of Panasonic and JVC which set up
in Longwy in 1986 and 1987 illustrates this situation (Le Monde, 15.10.1997). In 1997, they closed
down their affiliates. At least two elements explain why the return on investment was so fast :
- Public authorities subsidized a third of the total investment.6
- The branch plants were engaged in assembly activities which required unskilled labour. 
Consequently, training costs were limited.
These exemples do not prevent policy makers to considerer that large companies can reduce
inequalities between rich and poor regions. Critics have pointed to the fact that the European
Commission programmes are still providing financial funds to companies which invest in less
favoured regions. These policies are "mainly addressed to fighting symtoms (like high
unemployment) rather than causes (like low innovation potential)" (Morgan, p.496, 1997) However
it is now accepted that the contribution of SMEs and research capacities to the regional economic
development, cannot be neglected.
3.2. The role of regional public policies in networking activities
This new diagnosis is partly explained by the rise of peripheral economies. The role of
SMEs in the origins and dynamics of this renewal has been considered as important (Pike, Becattini
and Sengerberger, 1990).
For example, the economic recovery of the Swiss watch industry rested on the innovative
capacities of SMEs. During periods of major technological change, they introduced new models
and incorporated new technologies in existing products (Crevoisier, 1995). Large companies which
did not respond to the introduction of electronic watches (they did not believe in the success of
electronic and wanted to make profitable their previous investments), depended on local SMEs to
achieve new levels of profitability.
Similarly, the resurgence and the competitive advantage of Italian textile companies derived
from their ties with their external environment and from the quality of the linkages among different
actors (customers, suppliers, competitors...). Other European firms which did not rest on such
networks suffered from some weaknesses.
These performances are the result of a collective learning process which is embodied in tacit
rules. This means that institutional and production system are difficult to copy (Storper, 1995).
Public local authorities can attempt to promote collective capacities for the economic
development of their territory. If one considers that these capacities are not given but shaped
through a learning processs, this suggests that public authorities can still construct rules for
collective actions.
Because of this situation, regional institutions help small and medium firms which innovate
by gathering supply and demand for technology. Many intermediate agencies have been created to
stimulate collaboration between SMEs and their environment (Blondel, 1995). These public
intermediation structures are operating between scientific and productive areas. The role of the
technological intermediary institutions are threefold :
- The first is to transmit information : SMEs are usually aware of the competencies held by
research institutions. However, they have experienced difficulties to identify technological
knowledge suited to their needs (Conférences des DRRT, 1996).7
- Intermediaries do not confine their role to that of finding the best technology. It has to
provide technological and organizational assistance to ease the transfer between SMEs and research
institutions (Fiévet, 1997).
- Finally, they facilitate cooperation by discouraging opportunistic behavior. Intermediation
is built on trust. Managers which fear to disclose information which will benefit to their main
competitor should be less reluctant to inform their partners with the presence of intermediary
institutions (Tripsas, Schrader and Sobrero, 1995).
By strengthening the dialogue between SMEs and their environment, public authorities have
understood that SMEs can contribute to attract external investors. Indeed in many cases,
multinational companies partly derive their competitive advantage from their industrial links with
supporting industries (Porter, 1991).
Global companies will opt out regional network membership if their regional environment
does not provide them with specific assets (Colletis and Pecqueur, op.cit.). When a region possesses
specific resources, it reinforces the mutual interdependancy between the foreign investor and its
territory.
By giving the initial impetus to collaborations, regional authorities also helps SMEs to
develop their networking activities. This is a key point for the effectiveness of regional
development when we consider that SMEs encounter greater constraints than large companies to
have access to technological and commercial information (OCDE, 1993).
3.3. The role of networks in SMEs'competitiveness
What distinguishes SMEs in comparison with large companies is not in that they are less
innovative (Rothwell and Zegveld, 1982). The absence of hierarchical levels and horizontal
communications favours quick reaction to keep abreast of environmental disturbances and fast
changing market requirements. The crucial point is that they are often disadvantaged in their ability
to gather technical information of paramount importance (GREPME, 1994).
Firms which benefit from interpersonal contacts through networks will gain three kinds of
competitive advantages :
- Information is the nerve of competition which sets up among firms. Nevertheless, the
complexity of information makes it more difficult to master. Because of their lack of financial and
human resources, SMEs suffer vis-à-vis large firms, from an information gap. Networks are a way
to get extensive contacts with agents of new technologies. They allow SMEs to decode and
appropriate flows of information. The network validates their strategic plans for technological
development. It reinforces SMEs'competitiveness by providing them with a window on
technological change, sources of technical assistance, market requirements and strategic choices
made by other firms.
- Tacit knowledge is very important in innovation (Senker, 1995). This knowledge which is
not codified cannot be transferred through written documents (Dosi, 1988). It is embodied in the8
personal knowledge of technical and scientific agents. Therefore, personal networks which favour
acquaintances become the main channel for its transfer. To know who holds information is crucial
when one faces complex technological issues. Members of networks "provide the know-why,
know-how, know-when, and know-what necessary for entrepreneurial success" (Malecki and
Tootle, p.45, 1996).
- Innovation is characterised by its uncertainty. Firms need to raise financial means as soon
as they launch research projects. Conversely, results are uncertain and remote. Ten years can elapse
from research to commercialisation. As time passes, resources become more specific. This
augments the irreversibility of the firm’s commitment. Moreover, in many fields, where technical
changes are rapid and product life cycle very short, the acquisition of technology through traditional
means (licence agreement) turns out to be risky and subject to obsolescence. By using either formal
or informal networks, SMEs reduce their irreversibility costs and have access to new knowledge.
To improve SMEs’competitiveness and to encourage cooperative behavior, there has been a
growing number of regional initiatives (Rosenfeld, 1996). The goal is to give the initial impetus for
economic renewal. In the next section, we will focus on the approache which has been pursued by
the Chamber of Commerce and Industry located in Bourges (Cher) - Cher is one of the six
departments which composes the "Région Centre" -. In 1996, it has begun implementing a program
to spur collaboration among SMEs. The purpose has been to persuade firms to increase their
competitiveness and their market shares by developing networks.
4. The case of the center of sensors and automation development
There are at least three elements which make attractive the analysis of the intervention of the
Chamber of Commerce and Industry :
- Firstly, this initiative tries to foster local interfirm collaboration. On the long run, such a
policy should increase employment opportunities and the performance of the region in technical
change. It illustrates the switch from policies directed towards attracting foreign owned branch
plants to policies aimed at accelerating inter-firm cooperation.
- Secondly, it shows how public authorities can face the problem of conversion from
military production. One of the aim of the Chambre of Commerce is also to help locally based
companies that have been dependent on military contracts, to identify new potential markets.
- Finally, this intervention strives after promoting high tech activities (in the field of sensors
and automation).
After having related the historical background of this local initiative and described its
enforcement, we will focus on the results which have been achieved.
4.1. The history of the project aimed at developing sensors and automation activities
An association of engineers and scientists is at the origin of the center. In 1993, the
conversion of the military sector became a major concern for them. They thought that local human9
and industrial capabilities should contribute to renew the regional economy. New activities were
necessary to compensate losses in employment due to the conversion1. The sectors of sensors and
automation offered promising opportunities. Some regional SMEs had already developed strong
competitive position in automation networks and temperature sensors.
The region surrounding Bourges could also benefit from a technical military establishment
which had long been dedicated to military-related tests. This establishment has recently entered into
cooperative agreements with private companies.
In 1996, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Bourges carried on with this initiative
and conducted a market study to know if it was profitable to use local technological competencies
in the field of sensors and automation to have access to new business opportunities. Two niches
have been identified : The agroindustries equipment and the domotic for handicapped people.
At the end of 1996, a project manager has been hired by the Chambre of Commerce and
Industry to coordinate and drive the project.
4.2. The actors of the Center
4.2.1. The Chamber of Commerce and Industry
The first goal of the project manager is to ameliorate information flows among SMEs. This
should increase business opportunities. Traditionaly, the lack of technological skills was leading
firms not to answer to competitive bidding. Under the aegis of the Center, it should be easier for
SMEs to answer to competitive bidding which requires transverse capacities.
Another mission of the project manager is to promote collaboration among members and to
identify new markets. The existence of the Center should encourage firms to join together to solve
mutual problems.
To incite SMEs to participate, the project manager makes sure to provide services to SMEs
which join the Center. These services range from the promotion of the brand image of the Center to
the identification of new market and technological opportunities.
These different goals were translated into the organization of a business conference on
sensors and automation in Bourges in 1997. The aim was to make SMEs managers sensitive to the
application of microsystems and to help them to meet scientific, technological and financial
partners.
The Chamber of Commerce awards its financial support in collaboration with the city of
Bourges, regional and departmental public authorities, the Regional Office of the French Ministry
for Research and Technology (DRRT), the regional Office of the French Ministry for Industry and
the European Commission. For two years, the Pole has received 7 millions francs (about 1,06
millions Euros). During this period, the Pole has proposed its services free of charge. Indeed, the
                                                
1The district of Bourges has suffered from the rise of the unemployment rate. Between 1989 and 1995, the number of
employees has decreased from one percent in the area surrounding Bourges while it rises (+1,8%) in the whole
administrative region (Carriou, 1998).10
aim is to allow SMEs to pool their resources and to prove them that without this collaboration,
projects will not have been carried out. At the end of 1998, there will be an entrance fee.
4.2.2. Caracteristics of SMEs
13 SMEs belong to the Pole. These firms are located within a radius of 60 kilometers around
Bourges. This proximity should help them to establish commun codes of behaviour.
Firms belong to different sectors of production. In the mind of the initiators of the project, if
firms were competiting with each others, it would have prevent them for establishing cooperative
agreements. By gathering SMEs with complementary capacities, it widens the opportunity to have
access to new markets.
Firms core competencies can be divided into five sectors :
- Automation, industrial weighing and electrical equipments group together 4 firms. None of
them is integrated into a large company. Their number of employees is ranging from 15 to 60. The
existence of a design office favours the success of cooperative relationships. It proves that these
firms have already structured their innovative capabilities (Bougrain, 1997).
- The four firms in the sensors and instrumentation industry are more heterogeneous. One of
them employs just two people. Compared with the others, it does not have the same expectation. By
joining the Center the manager hopes to develop business opportunities. It does not expect to
increase the technological level of his company.
Among this group, another firm employs about 300 people and dedicates 15% of its sales to
research and development (R&D). This firm can be considered as the leader of the Center.
Despite different sizes and strategies, these firms are marketing their own products. Except
the smallest firm which supplies the agricultural market, the others have established closed
commercial relationships with aeronotics firms and have been awarded ISO 9001 certification from
the "Association Française pour l'Assurance Qualité". They had already forged external linkages
with educational establishments, research associations and clients.
- Micromechanical and microtechnical firms are subcontractors of the aeronotics and
defense sectors. They have already established commercial relationships with the some firms
belonging to the sensors and instrumentation industry. Each of the two firms employed 30
employees.
- The penultimate category gathers two firms which manufacture heating and air
conditioning appliances. Both of them are subsidiaries. One has recently been bought out by a
French group. But it is quite autonomous in its business activity. The other is controlled by an
Austrian group. The product line is defined by the group. Most of its subcontractors are selected on
an international basis.
- Finally, one firm is specialized in industrial software and data processing integration. Its
activity and know-how differ from those of the other companies.
This diversity has been deliberatly pursued by the investigators of the Center. They did not
try to recreate the same organizational structure as in Italian districts. Inside these districts, firms
are usually involved in few stages of the production process (Brusco, 1990). They also belong to the11
same vertically integrated branch. Interdependencies and strong specialization provides them with
strong market positions in their own sector.
The running of the Center is quite different. The aim is to develop products which are away
from firms initial activity. Diversification is possible because of collaboration. When they have to
face a competitive bidding SMEs should be able to take on more complex tasks. Operational tasks
are not divided up a priori. It clearly hinged on the evolution of the project and SMEs skills.
4.2.3. The industrial and scientific committee
The industrial and scientific committee constitutes the third entity. It is composed of
industrial and key figures representative of the scientific community. It gives its advices on
orientation and special questions.
4.3. The evaluation of the sensors and automation development
4.3.1. Methodology
Tempting to evaluate the impact of the Center so early in the process faces at least two
hurdles:
- Carrying out an assessment may be considered as premature. Far too little time has elapsed
to appreciate changes in the performance of individual firms. With the passing of time, one would
have judged better economic, technological and organizational spillovers.
- Secondly, it may seem presomptuous to isolate the outcomes of a specific action when one
knows that economic phenomena are usualy generated by multiple actions.
The assessment draws on a questionnaire which was sent to SMEs. Ten out of the thirteen
enterprises have returned it or/and accepted in-person or telephone interviews. This was used to
improve the quality of the survey that we collected.
4.3.2. The results of collective actions
The evaluation of public intervention focuses on three issues :
- The extent to which inter-firm collaboration has occurred.
- The degree to which collective action has lead to the access to new markets.
- The scope to which access to technological and commercial information have become
easier.
According to these three points, the assessment is ambiguous. Two years after the creation
of the Center, interfirm collaboration is rather limited.
Among SMEs, only two firms which did not have any relationships before the creation of
the Center, have initiated a technological partnership. With a third company, they have joined
together to develop a new product. This collective activity has resulted in an increase in revenue for
the smallest firm. Two others SMEs have also signed a sales agreement. One firm in the
micromechanical industry supplies one of the two firms which manufactures heating appliances.12
According to the firms which have collaborated, these new relationships have lead to limited
technological and commercial spillovers.
The two niches which have been identified by market studies did not generate yet an
increase in sales. However, new firms have been approached. One manager considered that it could
engender new business opportunities. These weak commercial spillovers should not lead SMEs to
hire supplementary staff.
However, thanks to the project manager, firms gain access to new sources of information.
They have developed new contacts with their external environment. Eight of the ten which
responded to our survey, declared that by joining the Center they have expanded their information
networks. The organization of a conference on sensors and automation was also considered as a
positive event. It was a good way to improve the public image of the Center vis-à-vis potential
partners.
This proves again that one of the main problem facing SMEs is their inabilities to forge
suitable external linkages.
If one examines the expectations and the results, one can be disappointed. Thus, it seems
necessary to explain why SMEs have been reluctant to cooperate to be more effective in the field of
innovation.
4.3.3. Obstacles to collaboration
Business people were asked about the obstacles to their involvment in collective actions.
Some of them consider that the goals of the initiators of the Center are to ambituous both from a
commercial and technological point of view. They are keenly aware that market studies seem to
afford interesting outlets. However, the niches which were identified, are not linked to the sales
capabilities of the firms. The firms feal that it is very hazardous to diversify their production in
those fields of activities.
Few executives believe that it would have been more effective to reply to competititve
biddings which are connected to their technological know-how. Such collaborations would have
been less risky. It would not have provoked the emergence of costly investment. Firms would have
progressively learned to work together. When complex equipments are developed uncertainty is
considerable. Cooperation is necessary because the caracteristics of the product are unknown. But it
takes time to establish common codes of information (Lundvall, 1988). Most SMEs which have
limited external linkages with their environment (four of them declared that they did not have
technological relationships with other firms in their daily business), are not ready to invest time in
complex partnership agreements. They are already struggling to keep their market share in their
own business.
Most SMEs are not involved in the meetings organized by the project manager when it is
necessary to discuss about the needs of the firms. These attitudes are not propitious to the
development of close interaction among SMEs. Consequently all the firms are not aware of the
needs of the member of the Center. The lack of time due to business pressure may explain the13
adoption of this strategy. These results confirm that failure to realize benefits quickly enough can
prevent SMEs to develop time consuming collaboration (Rosenfeld, op.cit.).
The heterogeneity among firms can also be considered as a drawback. Few firms share an
homogeneous system of value and views. One distinguishes two groups of firms : The first is
composed by high-tech firms which export a large part of their production, have already pooled
their resources with another partner and are used to benefit from financial public aids. The second
comprises SMEs which belong to traditionnal industries, are less innovative and hope that the
creation of the Center will lead to an increase of their turnover.
5.Conclusion
The Bourges area which has been weakened by the conversion from the military sector,
strives to diversify its production activities. The development of the Center for sensors and
automation lies within the scope of this new policy.
The historical background of the Center is to recent to affirm that this attempt will be
crowned with success. For the moment, the results are quite far away from the expectations. Local
interfirm collaboration has not been fostered as expected by the initiators of the project.
Moreover, the distance from Paris does not permit to benefit from the setting up of new
industrial companies. Inside the "Région Centre" which gathers six departments, only three have
succeeded during the last years to attract new investors. Their geographical proximity with the Paris
conurbation explains this situation. In any case, this structural weakness constitutes a strong limit to
the economic development of the area surrounding Bourges.
A promising future for this region might be the presence of technical higher education
institutions. Indeed, during the last few years, regional authorities have decided to promote the
location of university branches, technical and engineering schools outside the "capitals" (Orléans
and Tours) of the "Région Centre". Cities such as Bourges have strongly benefited from this policy.
In the future, it could contribute to create a common system of value and to develop technological
partnerships. However, such positive externalities strongly depends on the degree of interaction
between industrial companies and higher education institutions.
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